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Abstract 
Analyzing carbon emissions is critical for successfully managing sustainable production and 
consumption. In a dual channel supply chain that includes traditional retailers and online e-tailers, 
consumer free riding often occurs when consumers enjoy the services provided by a traditional 
retailer but make purchases at a lower price from an e-tailer. The specific aim of this paper, 
therefore, is to evaluate the impact of consumer free riding on a product’s life cycle carbon 
emissions across a dual channel closed loop supply chain and to assess the effect of governmental 
e-commerce tax on carbon emissions. The study comprises a systematic comparison and numerical 
analysis of cases in which consumers do or do not free ride. Our results show that although 
manufacturers may gain economic benefits from consumer free riding behavior, total carbon 
emissions across the supply chain increase too, and a governmental tax on e-commerce can help 
reduce consumer free riding and total carbon emissions. But in consideration of social welfare 
maximization, a government may have to subsidize the e-tailer. 
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1. Introduction 
Sustainable production and consumption requires effective “green” supply chain management to 
generate both economic and environmental benefits by reducing waste, minimizing pollution, 
saving energy, conserving natural resources, and reducing carbon emissions (Zhu, Sarkis, & Geng, 
2005). Green supply chain management involves activities ranging from green product design to 
closed loop product return processing or recovery (Srivastava, 2007). However, the first step in 
controlling carbon footprints across a supply chain network is to analyze carbon emissions 
(Sundarakani, De Souza, Goh, Wagner, & Manikandan, 2010). Initial academic studies in this area 
have generated several useful insights (e.g. Cholette & Venkat, 2009; Lee, 2011; Sundarakani et 
al., 2010; Wu, Nagurney, Liu, & Stranlund, 2006). For instance, Cholette and Venkat (2009) 
provide estimates of carbon emissions associated with transportation links and warehousing 
activities in food and beverage supply chains, while Sundarakani et al. (2010) propose an initial 
analytical model that measures carbon emissions from both stationary and nonstationary supply 
chain processes. Yet with respect to modeling carbon emissions, the literature is still sparse, and 
much more investigation is needed (Lee, 2011).     
At the same time, the rapid growth of broadband and the mobile Internet has greatly changed 
supply chain structures. Firms are now distributing their products through both offline retail stores 
and online e-tailers (Chiang, Chhajed, & Hess, 2003). For example, in 2014, China’s online 
shopping increased 48.7% over the previous year, which constitutes 10% of the total retail sales 
of consumer goods, and the e-commerce market is expected to continue this fast growth 
momentum (iResearch, 2015). In fact, e-commerce has been widely hailed as a revolution that is 
permanently transforming the landscape of consumer/supplier relationships. Not only is dual 
channel distribution becoming the new norm for managing closed loop supply chains, but the 
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Internet is providing consumers with a new way to interact with their supply chain (Ma, Zhao, & 
Ke, 2013). Today’s consumers often go to a traditional brick-and-mortar store, enjoy the service 
provided by the retailer, find out about a product’s function or even try it out but then make the 
final purchase of the same product from an e-tailer at a lower price, because online shoppers are 
not required to pay state and local sales tax (usually 5% to 10% of the selling price), which gives 
the e-tailers a pricing advantage. Worried retailers are getting more and more angry about 
consumers’ free riding behavior and the unfair taxation and has been lobbying the government to 
tax on e-commerce for many years (Jopson, 2013).Yet although several prior studies have 
investigated how such consumer free riding may affect traditional retailers or e-tailers’ decisions 
(e.g. Balakrishnan, Sundaresan, & Zhang, 2014b; Bernstein, Song, & Zheng, 2009; Perdikaki & 
Swaminathan, 2013), it is not yet clear how this phenomenon affects carbon emissions within the 
structure of a dual channel closed loop supply chain. This study therefore aims to fill this void in 
the literature by considering carbon emissions in a dual channel closed loop supply chain structure 
in which a manufacturer distributes products through both a traditional retailer channel and an e-
tailer channel, and collects used products from consumers for remanufacturing. 
One important aspect of a dual channel closed loop supply chain is the role played by 
government. For instance, whereas governmental subsidies help firms to optimize the operations 
of integrated logistics networks, the imposition of a general sales tax on e-commerce transactions 
may increase the price at which the e-tailer sells (Sheu, Chou, & Hu, 2005). In dual channel supply 
chain, the manufacturer and the retailer are beneficiaries of the governmental consumption subsidy 
towards CLSC(Ma et al., 2013). Looking from the perspective of product life cycle, the aggregate 
carbon emissions generated during a product’s life consists of emissions in production, use by 
consumers, recovery process and end-of-life stage (Atasu et al. 2009; Atasu and Souza, 2013). As 
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consumer free riding behavior will affect the total market demand quantity, that means the quantity 
of production, recycling, usage and landfill will be correspondingly affected. Not only that, with 
rapid growing of e-commerce, Internet retailers can often exploit nationwide markets with physical 
locations in only one or a few states and they have more locational flexibility than their traditional 
bricks and mortar counterparts. E-tailers can avoid establishing nexus in a state by ensuring that 
their degree of physical presence does not rise to the level determined to establish nexus by that 
state. This will cause tax evasion and annual e-commerce sales tax revenue losses grow rapidly 
(Bruce et al., 2015). Due to this unfair taxation situation, with some scholars and traditional 
retailers’ lobbying, some governments are considering tax on e-commerce to prevent tax revenue 
losses, consumer free-riding and protect traditional retailers. Thus, a governmental tax on e-
commerce will affect the decisions of consumers and supply chain members, which also affects 
the aggregate carbon emissions of a product’s life cycle. This study thus seeks to answer the 
following research questions:   
1. How does consumer free riding affect carbon emissions?  
2. How does an e-commerce tax affect carbon emissions?   
The analysis thus makes a valuable contribution to the literature assessing carbon emissions 
or the control of carbon footprints across a dual channel closed loop supply chain structure. In 
particular, our numerical modeling suggests that, compared with the no-free riding case, free riding 
may increase total carbon emissions and that a governmental tax on the e-tailer may help reduce 
them, thereby benefiting the environment.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. 
Section 3 discusses the assumptions and notations. Section 4 describes the model formulation. 
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Section 5 provides the numerical examples for examining the propositions. Section 6 concludes 
the study and outlines directions for future research. 
 
  
 7 
 
2. Literature review 
This study is closely related to three streams of literature: closed loop supply chain considering 
carbon emissions, tax to e-commerce and consumer free riding in multichannel retailing context. 
Closed loop supply chain considering carbon emissions   
    The closed loop supply chain allows firms to achieve both economic value and a reduced carbon 
footprint because it considers both the forward flow of material from suppliers to manufacturers 
to distributors to retailers to consumers and the reverse flow of used products back to the 
manufacturers for recovery closed loop(Souza, 2013). Such recovery recaptures the resources 
locked up in the product, which can be reclaimed with relatively low effort for collection, testing, 
disassembly, repair, recycling, and so forth (Krikke, 2011). It thus reduces the need for virgin 
resources by replacing part of the forward supply chain, thereby reducing carbon footprints. By 
using different research methods, some researchers study the CLSC operations under different 
carbon emission policy constraint (Fareeduddin et al.,2015;Garg et al., 2015;Mohajeri and 
Fallah,2015;Talaei et al., 2015;Tao et al.,2015). Specifically, Fareeduddin et al.(2015) find that 
carbon cap policy imposes a strict constraint on the amount of carbon emissions generated in CLSC 
supply chain operations. Garg et al.(2015) determine the optimal flow of parts and products in the 
CLSC network under low carbon logistics. By considering uncertainty on product demands and 
returns, Mohajeri and Fallah (2015) find that customer demand and the recovery rate were the 
main factors in an uncertain CLSC environment. Talaei et al.(2015) propose a mixed-integer linear 
programming model that capable of reducing the network total costs and the rate of carbon dioxide 
emission in the environment.Tao et al. (2015) find that carbon policies in CLSC network can 
restrict players' behaviors and when the total permitted carbon emissions are so low that the 
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periodic carbon emission policies may be superior to the global carbon emission policies. In 
consideration of production,Low et al. (2015) demonstrate how the carbon footprint can be broken 
down based on the product structure and show that the implementation of the closed-loop 
production system can potentially result in an overall carbon footprint reduction of 39.91 million 
kg CO2. While some other researchers study the CLSC and carbon emissions by using case study 
in practice. For example, taking copiers industry as example, Krikke (2011) find that compared 
with current and global-local CLSC network design, a regional CLSC network with combined 
forward and reverse facilities per continent proves most efficient and robust in view of uncertain 
exogenous variables. Based on companies and government in Australia, Fahimnia et al. (2013) 
evaluate the influences of CLSC on the carbon footprint and find that variations in environmental 
impacts occur over ranges of carbon pricing. Based on household plastic waste recycling, Bing et 
al. (2015) redesign the global reverse supply chain under the emission trading scheme and show 
that global relocation of re-processors leads to both a reduction of total costs and total 
transportation emission.Yet despite these initial efforts of modeling carbon emissions – an 
important phenomenon in today’s Internet age – this literature neglects the issues of consumer free 
riding and e-commerce tax.   
E-commerce tax 
One of the characteristics electronic retailers differentiate from traditional retailers is that  
Internet retailers enjoy a clear and quite significant pricing advantage over traditional brick-and-
mortar retailers: a consumer does not have to pay sales tax when purchasing from internet retailers 
who do not have a nexus (or physical presence) in her state. This will cause significant sales tax 
revenue losses to states and governments. Based on this, Hale and McNeal (2011) find that it may 
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be the case that states begin to drop their political objections in order to participate in a cooperative, 
technological solution to streamline state sales tax systems in order to collect billions of dollars in 
revenue from taxes that are levied but unrealized. Bruce et al. (2015) find that firms are more likely 
to have nexus in large states, and that the effect of policy on nexus decisions appears to be 
relatively immediate and state efforts to either reduce sales tax rates or shrink sales tax bases to 
attract online retailers are not likely to be fruitful. With an expanding e-commerce volume, states 
enacted legislation to exercise its taxing power over remote vendors but such legislation was 
opposed and resisted by e-commerce vendors. Ward et al.(2012) point out that this controversy 
should be resolved within the next few years and if resolved, the tax playing field will be level for 
all retailers: those which are solely e-commerce businesses, those that are both brick-and-mortar 
and e-commerce businesses, and traditional Main Street businesses. Hu and Tang (2014) find that 
sales tax has a significant impact on consumers' purchase decisions, and such an impact varies 
across consumer segments, types of products, and channels. In China, the same problem also exists 
that the current tax system has not cover the Internet sales. Wei and Du (2009) uses the method of 
Principal-Agent mechanisms to propose that the Governments should take out countermeasures to 
prevent the loss of tax revenue.Jing (2015) suggests that government should consider tangible 
goods in accordance with the interim regulations on value-added Tax rules. If the individual 
consumers buy physical goods or goods via the Internet and take the traditional transport mode, 
and it is suitable to collect value-added Tax. 
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Consumer free riding in multichannel retailing context 
Today, because of the growing use of information technology and multichannel retailing, 
consumer free riding phenomenon has become much more prominent (Balakrishnan, Sundaresan, 
& Zhang, 2014a). Consumers may, for instance, use a brick-and-mortar store to experience the 
product but purchase from an e-tailer and this offline-to-online free riding is referred to as 
“showrooming” (Balakrishnan et al., 2014a). It is also widely accepted that consumer free riding 
not only negatively affects retailers’ profits but also those of the manufacturers who supply the 
retailers (!!! INVALID CITATION !!!). Thus, many studies focus on the strategies that 
manufacturers could use to avoid free riding; in particular, limiting distribution or imposing 
vertical restraints on the prices, locations, and sales of retail firms (!!! INVALID CITATION !!!). 
Xing and Liu (2012), for example, examine manufacturers and retailers’ use of price matching and 
compensation rebate contracts to combat free riding. Several other studies, however (!!! INVALID 
CITATION !!!), suggest that free riding may improve supply chain profits by helping to create 
differentiation between competing retailers. Nevertheless, none of these studies considers free 
riding’s implications for carbon emissions or explores how government taxes could influence the 
carbon emission associated with free riding. Hence, in this paper, when modeling carbon emissions 
across a closed loop supply chain, we incorporate consumer free riding and take into account 
government taxes aimed at restraining it.  
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3. Assumptions and Notations  
Based on observations from current practice, we consider the model of a manufacturer with 
remanufacturing capability who sells its products (including re-manufactured products) through 
both a traditional retailer (hereafter retailer) and an online retailer (e-tailer). Government is also 
included. To encourage recycling, the government may provide subsidy for the manufacturer’s 
recovery and to prevent tax evasion of e-commerce and consumer free riding behavior, the 
government may impose tax on the e-tailer (Fig.1). 
                      Recycling fees pay for consumers 
 
 
                                                     Forward selling flow        
                                                                     
                                                          Reverse used products flow  
 
                                                          Currency flow 
 
                                   Governmental tax on e-tailer 
     
         Governmental subsidy for manufacturer’s recovery 
Fig.1 Dual channel closed loop supply chain 
  
Manufacturer 
Retailer 
Consumers 
E-tailer 
Government 
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  Table 1.     Notations 
  Symbol  Definition 
V  Consumers’ initial valuation of the product 
f  The degree of substitution between the retailer and the e-tailer 
s  Service level of the retailer 
  Scaling parameter of service investment 
  Consumer sensitivity to the retailer’s service level 
t  Consumers’ misfit cost per unit distance 
  Extent of valuation reduction through free riding 
c  Unit production cost of the new product 
0c  Unit cost of remanufacturing a returned product into a new one 
0r  Per unit cost saving from recovery and reuse of components ( 0 0r c c  ) 
n  The per unit benefit from recycling minus per unit recovery and processing cost 
 
0r r if it is quality recovery and r n if it is material recovery 
ic  Unit selling costs of the sellers ( ,i r e , r  retailer, e  e-tailer) 
k  Scaling parameter of used product collection 
  Recovery rate of used products 
je  Unit carbon emissions of a product during life cycle ( , , ,j p u r eol where 
 p production, u  use, r  recovery, eol  end-of-life) 
iq  Market demand of retailer and e-tailer ( ,i r e , r  retailer, e  e-tailer) 
w  Wholesale price for the retailer and e-tailer 
rp  Retail price of the retailer 
ep  Retail price of the e-tailer 
I  Total lifecycle carbon emissions of the dual channel closed loop supply chain 
l  The profit function of firm l , , ,el R R M where R  retailer, eR  e-tailer,  
M manufacturer 
    CW       Consumer welfare 
    SW       Social welfare 
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As in most operational/economics/marketing literature from the seminal work of Hotelling 
(1929) to the dual channel model presented in Desai et al. (2010) and Xu et al. (2010), we 
conceptualize the end-product market as a straight line with exogenously specified locations for 
the retailer and e-tailer, who are f distance apart (see in Fig.2). The buyers of a commodity are 
assumed to be uniformly distributed along a virtual line, with those located to the left of the retailer 
loyal to the retailer and those located to the right of the e-tailer loyal to the e-tailer. Consumers 
located between the two are switchers.  
 
       Loyal to retailer           Switchers     Loyal to e-tailer 
          
                   Retailer       f         E-tailer 
 
Fig. 2 End-product market characteristics  
   
For the sake of simplicity, our assumptions about consumer preferences, channel members’ 
costs, and the decision-making framework are as follows: 
Assumption 1. The consumers’ valuation of their ideal product is V , and the consumers are 
indifferent between the two kinds of retailers in product valuation. Their valuations for the 
retailer’s service s are s . When free riding occurs, consumers may first visit the retailer to enjoy 
the service and then go to the e-tailer to purchase the product. By doing so, however, they may be 
unable to take full advantage of the service the retailer provides. For example, when salesmen 
know that a consumer has come into the store simply to try out the commodity before purchasing 
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more cheaply elsewhere, they will serve the consumer out of courtesy but will not make a one 
hundred percent effort. Thus, the benefit that these consumers can get from free riding is s . 
Following the assumptions in Tsay and Agrawal (2000), Xia and Gilbert (2007), Desai et al. (2012), 
Wu (2012), among others, the cost of service is 2 2s , and for simplicity, we assume that 2  1. 
The consumers’ misfit costs (disutilities) along the straight line are t per unit, which represents the 
psychological costs of a store’s layout and information delivery format being different from those 
at a given consumer’s ideal store (cf. Pazgal and Soberman, 2008; Desai et al., 2010; Xu et al., 
2010). The consumers’ locations represent their preferences for a product, while a longer (shorter) 
distance between the location of consumer and store indicates that the consumer sees the store as 
less (more) than ideal. Like Pazgal and Soberman (2008), we simplify computation by normalizing
t to 1.  
We also assume, in line with Desai et al. (2010), that the firms’ feature choices impose misfit 
costs on consumers who want a different combination of features. It is these consumer-borne misfit 
costs that enable a firm to segment a market and create a differentiated offering that better serves 
the requirements of the target segment (while being less valuable to other consumers). Consumers 
incur a loss of utility when they buy a commodity other than their ideal, a loss that depends on the 
misfit cost, which varies linearly with distance. Because the e-tailer provides no service, its 
coefficient is 0. 
The retailer’s sales effort is crucial for winning the market share. For instance, the retailer can 
stimulate demand by advertising the products’ features and providing attractive shelf space and 
point-of-sale demonstrations by sales people. Because the sales effort also incurs significant 
                                                          
1 In reality, the value of the coefficient would have no obvious influence on the firms’ equilibrium results. 
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investment, it is vital that the retailer make the optimal sales effort decision and retail margin 
decision in the channel (Gao et al., 2016).  
Assumption 2. All firms have access to the same information, and the decisions are considered 
in a single-period setting. Producing a new product from a used product is less costly than 
manufacturing a new one; that is, cc 0 and 0c is the same for all re-manufactured products. The 
return rate of used products from the consumers is  . As in Atasu and Souza (2013), we consider 
two type of recovery: the quality recovery of components that after some reprocessing can be 
reused in new production and the material recovery of components or materials that cannot be 
reused in new production but can be recycled to make a net profit (e.g., the often profitable 
recovery of precious metal from cell phones; see Geyer and Blass, 2010; Atasu and Souza, 2013). 
For quality recovery, the production cost of meeting demand q is 0( )c r q where 00 ccr  , while for 
material recovery, the production cost is cq . The collection investment effort is given by 2( )k q , 
where k is assumed to be sufficiently large that 1  , and more specifically, 8k r  (cf. Savaskan et 
al., 2004; Gao et al., 2015). This latter assumption inherently means that collection is difficult and 
economically nonviable enough that the manufacturer does not try to recover all used products. 
Assumption 3. The marginal operation cost of the retailer is rc and that of the e-tailer is ec . 
Because ec is too small relative to rc , for the sake of modeling simplicity, we normalize it to 0. 
Assumption 4. As in Savaskan et al. (2004) and Savaskan and Wossenhove (2006), the 
sequence of the firm’s decisions is as follows: the manufacturer decides on the return rate and 
announces the uniform wholesale price for both sellers. The sellers then simultaneously decide 
their retail prices and service level. In dealing with the retailer and e-tailer, the manufacturer 
always acts as a Stackelberg leader, so the research uses a Stackelberg game that can be either a 
complete information dynamic game and/or a simple leader-follower game. This game has a 
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hierarchy consisting of an upper level decision maker who is the leader and lower level decision 
makers who are followers in a subordinate position. All players make their decisions successively, 
with those who decide later already knowing the decision of the player who decided first and this 
latter able to anticipate this consequence before the decision of the later decider. Hence, to solve 
the Stackelberg game, we use backward induction from the last game stage, analyze the decisions 
of the players at this stage and then at the previous stage, and finally stop at the first stage. 
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4. Model formulation 
Before proceeding with the analysis, we need to first delineate the firms’ demand functions. The 
point of market demand division between the two sellers lies in the marginal point at which a 
consumer is indifferent between buying from the retailer or the e-tailer. Consumers will choose 
the one that gives them greater utility. As in Desai et al. (2010) and Xu et al. (2010), in our model, 
a consumer’s net utility from buying at any seller equals the consumer’s valuation minus the costs 
related to this purchase (product price, psychological costs of buying process). For example, with 
the help of a retailer’s service, a consumer’s initial valuationV could be increased to sV  , so that 
a consumer located between the retailer and e-tailer would have a net utility of 
rV s p x    when 
buying from the retailer and a net utility of ( )eV p f x    when buying from the e-tailer. Here, x 2 
is the psychological distance between the consumer’s location and the retailer’s location. If 
consumers do not free ride on the retailer’s service and only visit one seller, they constitute only 
two types: those that only purchase directly from the retailer and those that only purchase directly 
from the e-tailer. The distance x between the indifferent consumer’s location from the retailer 
should then satisfy ( )r eV s p x V p f x       ; that is, ( ) 2r ex s p p f    . If x represents the distance 
between the retailer and a consumer located on the retailer’s left side or the distance between the 
e-tailer and a consumer located on the e-tailer’s right side, then the consumer to the left will choose 
to purchase from the retailer if 0rV s p x    while the consumer located to the right will do so if
0eV p x   .  
                                                          
2 When consumers choose their ideal product, there is a gap between the product a firm provides and the consumer’ ideal 
product, which here is represented by .  x
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When consumer free riding occurs, however, as in Desai et al. (2010), consumers are of three 
types: those that only purchase directly from the retailer, those that only purchase directly from 
the e-tailer, and the free riding consumers who enjoy the retailer’s service but make the final 
purchase from the e-tailer. In this case, our calculations of market demand should gear the amount 
of free riding consumers to the e-tailer’s market demand. When the marginal consumer who is 
indifferent between purchasing directly from the retailer and consuming the retailers’ service but 
makes the final purchase from the e-tailer is located
1x distance from the retailer, 1x satisfies 
1r eV s p x V s p f       
3
 ; that is, 1 (1 ) r ex s p p f      . When the marginal consumer who is 
indifferent between consuming the retailer’s service and directly purchasing from the e-tailer but 
who makes the final purchase from the e-tailer is located 2x distance from the retailer, 2x  satisfies 
2( )e eV s p f V p f x        and 2x s . Thus, the firms’ demands can be expressed as 
 
                    ( ) 2r r eV s p s p p f       ,   if free riding is absent 
             
rq     
                    2 (1 )r eV s p s f p        ,    if free riding is present      
 
                                                          
3 We adopt the same assumption as in Desai et al. (2010) about a free riding consumer’s traveling distance when visiting 
one store with a higher valuation level and making the final purchase at another store. Because the location and traveling 
costs along this distance represent only a psychological sensation disutility for the consumer (i.e., no physical travel is 
involved), the repeated computation of travel to the retailer and turn back to the e-tailer need not be considered. That is, 
the total traveling distance for free riding equals the distance between the consumer’s location and one store plus the 
distance between the consumer’s location and the other store. 
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                    ( ) 2e r eV p f s p p     ,       if free riding is absent 
             
eq     
                    2 (1 )e rV p s p     ,          if free riding is present 
 
4.1. Firm decisions when free riding is absent or present  
In deriving the manufacturers and retailers’ decisions in different cases, we represent the 
problems of all the players as follows:  
2
,
max ( )
r
R r r r
s p
p w c q s      
max ( )
e
e
R e e
p
p w q    
2
,
max ( )( ) ( ( ))M r e r e
w
w c r q q k q q

       
 
where
0r r n 
 
Proposition 1. a) When free riding is absent, the equilibrium decisions of all players are 
2
2 2
(140 51 )
6 ((28 6 )( ) (14 3 ) 14 )r
r
k V c f c


 


    
,
2 2
2
(28 6 )( ) (14 3 ) 14
4(14 3 )
rV c f cw
 

    


 
2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
2 2
(5488 2604 306 ) (2744 1302 153 ) (2352 1932 306 ) (2856 3006 612 )
4(140 51 )(14 3 )
r
r
V f c c
p
       
 
          

 
 
2 2 2
2 2
3 ((196 42 )( ) (98 21 ) (378 102 )
2(140 51 )(14 3 )
rV c f cs
   
 
     

 
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2 4 2 4 2 4 2
2 2
(5488 3276 450 ) (2744 1638 225 ) (2352 1260 162 ) (504 234 )
4(140 51 )(14 3 )
r
e
V f c c
p
      
 
         

 
 
b) When free riding occurs, the equilibrium decisions of all players are 
 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
30 (14 13 3 )
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5
r
r
AV A c A f A c
p
A
  
 , 9 10 11 12
5
r
e
A V A c A f A c
p
A
  
 where 
2
1
2 4 2 3 4800 (520 540 140 ) (84 176 137 47 6 )A                 
2
2
2 4 2 3 4400 (400 400 100 ) (84 176 137 47 6 )A                 
2 2 4 2 3 4
3 520 (276 302 82 ) (28 68 59 22 3 )A                 
2
4
2 4 2 3 4440 (612 574 134 ) (168 324 234 75 9 )A                 
2 2 2 2
5 2(20 (6 7 2 ))(30 (14 13 3 ))A             
2
6
2 3(200 100 (60 100 55 10 ))A           
2
7
2 3(220 110 (76 120 63 11 ))A           
2 2 3
8 (460 230 (168 260 134 23 ))A           
2 2 4 2 3 4
9 (800 (640 680 180 ) (120 260 210 75 10 ))A                  
2 2 4
1
2
0
3 4(400 (280 260 60 ) (48 92 64 19 2 ))A                 
2 2 4 2
1
4
1
3(280 (224 268 78 ) (40 100 90 35 5 ))A                 
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2 2
2
2 4
1
4 3(40 (32 124 54 ) (40 60 30 5 ))A                
 
For brevity, all proofs are provided in the appendix. 
Corollary 1. In both cases, the return rate is higher (lower) with a lower (higher) f ; the wholesale 
price, retail prices, and service level are higher (lower) with a higher (lower) f .  
The profit from remanufacturing is the cost saving benefit 0 ( )r er q q  minus the recovery cost
2( ) ( ( ))r e r en q q k q q    . Solving the first- and second-order conditions of   yields
2( ) 2 ( )M r e r er q q k q q




   

and
2
2
2
2 ( ) 0M r ek q q



   

. Then the optimal value of is *
2 ( )r e
r
k q q
 

. Keeping all 
else unchanged, when f is larger, the total market share ( )r eq q increases and the return rate 
decreases. This outcome is in line with the real-world dynamic that as market demand increases, 
recycling costs increase accordingly because it is much harder for manufacturers to manage returns 
efficiently.  
When f represents the positioning difference of the retailer and e-tailer, the difference is lower 
(higher), competition/substitution intensifies, and sellers tend to set lower (higher) retail prices to 
attract switchers. Then, in anticipation of the sellers’ competitive low prices, the manufacturer 
tends to set a lower wholesale price as competition/substitution intensifies. When f increases 
(decreases), some of the switchers’ free riding utility decreases (increases) as their free riding 
misfit cost increases (decreases). In this condition, free riding is less attractive and the retailer 
increases the service level to attract more consumers.  
Corollary 2. In both cases, the return rate increases with such supply chain cost factors as c , r , rc . 
The wholesale price, e-tailer’s price, and retailer’s service level decrease with rc . 
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Naturally, when production cost is high, the manufacturer transfers the cost pressure to sellers, 
a transfer that is reflected in pricing decisions and reduces market demand. This lower market 
demand combines with a higher return rate. On the other hand, when trying to relieve high cost 
pressure, the manufacturer also tends to take in more used products for remanufacturing because 
an increasing return rate lowers the average unit production cost, especially when the cost saving 
from remanufacturing increases. This observation, however, raises the question of why, all else 
being equal, an increase in the retailer’s marginal operation cost increases the return rate. We 
propose the following answer: Because this cost increases the retailer’s pricing level but decreases 
its service level, it decreases the market share that the manufacturer can earn from the retailer. Yet 
this cost increase also makes the retailer’s price much less competitive than the e-tailer’s price, 
which increases the market share that the manufacturer can earn from the e-tailer. At the same 
time, the total market share is lower because the e-tailer’s price is less sensitive to the change in 
its competitor’s cost increase. Thus, all else unchanged, a higher rc  reduces total market demand 
and increases the return rate. 
Corollary 3. In this model, the cost saving from remanufacturing has no impact on prices and 
market demand. 
As described in proposition 1, the cost saving r is only reflected in the return rate decision.  
 
4.2. Environmental impact and governmental subsidy for remanufacturing 
According to Atasu et al. (2009) and Atasu and Souza (2013), a product’s lifecycle is composed 
of production, consumer use, recovery, and end-of-life in a landfill. The carbon emissions per unit 
of product during these processes can be denoted by pe , ue , re , eole , respectively (see Fig. 3). 
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Typically, only a fraction of the carbon emissions are actually emitted during production. For 
example, in the case of international toy maker Lego, only 10 percent of the total CO2 emission 
related to Lego products originate from production processes at the Lego factories. The remaining 
90 percent stem from supply chain activities such as raw material extraction and refinement, 
indirect procurement, distribution from Lego factories to toy stores around the world, and end-of-
life impact when the products are eventually scrapped (www.environmentalleader.com, 2013).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 3. Life cycle carbon emissions of the dual channel supply chain 
The total quantity of life cycle carbon emissions can thus be expressed as    
( (1 ) (1 ))( )p r u eol r eI e e e e q q         .
4 
                                                          
4Given the total market share quantity r eq q , the recovery and remanufacturing quantity is ( )r eq q  and the quantity of producing 
new products is (1 )( )r eq q  . Thus the carbon emissions generated during recovery stage is ( )r r ee q q  and carbon emission 
generated during production of new products is (1 )( )p r ee q q  . The total carbon emissions generated during consumption stage 
is ( )u r ee q q and with the recovered products are not put in landfill, the carbon emissions generated during landfill stage is
(1 )( )eol r ee q q  . 
Production 
emissions 
Product use 
emissions 
product use 
 
Recovery 
emissions 
Waste products/ 
landfill emissions 
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The equation can be simplified as ( )( )r eI E e q q   where p eol re e e e   . According to this 
equation, 1  and E e , meaning that 0E e  , so that, as lemma 1 shows, the total recovery amount
( )r eq q  is unchanged by free riding. Hence, the total quantity of carbon emissions is always 
positively influenced by market demand, and how consumer free riding impacts the total 
environment depends strictly on whether this free riding increases or decreases market demand.  
On the other hand, to promote remanufacturing activities, governments may pay subsidies to 
a manufacturer proportional to the remanufacturing volume (Mitra and Webster, 2008; Sheu and 
Chen, 2012). Assuming that the government provides subsidy h per remanufactured unit for the 
manufacturer, then the manufacturer’s profit function is 
2
,
max ( ( ) )( ) ( ( ))M r e r e
w
w c r h q q k q q

          
Hence, when free riding is absent, social welfare is 
max ( )
eM R R r eh
SW CW h q q          
* * * * * *
* * *
* * * * * *2 2
0 0 0 0
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r e r e
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f s p p f s p p
V p V s p
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 

 
     
  
                  
and when free riding is present, social welfare is 
max ( )
eM R R r eh
SW CW h q q          
* * * * * * *
* * *
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Proposition 2. a) Whether free riding is present or absent, the government’s optimal decision is 
always *h e . b) The subsidy reduces the total environmental impact. c) The subsidy increases 
the return rate but has no influence on prices, consumer welfare, or sellers’ profits.  
According to this proposition, consumer free riding behavior does not affect a government’s 
subsidy decision. That is, if environmental impact depends on only two factors – market demand 
and return rate – then because the subsidy has no influence on prices and market demand remains 
unchanged, the return rate will be augmented and the environmental impact reduced. This 
proposition also reflects the fact that in this model, although free riding changes the firms’ 
decisions and the quantity of market demand, it does not change the governmental subsidy. In fact, 
as regards the manufacturer’s objective function, the subsidy plays a role in increasing the 
manufacturer’s cost savings. As stated in lemmas 3 and 4, respectively, the change in cost savings
r is not reflected in the manufacturer’s wholesale price and the total recovery amount ( )r eq q  does 
not change regardless of whether free riding is present or absent. 
 
4.3. Governmental tax on the e-tailer 
In the face of recent U.S. Senate legislation that ended tax-free shopping online (Jopson, 2013), 
we now consider whether governments should impose taxes on e-tailers and if so, what the impact 
might be not only on firms but also on consumers, the environment, and social welfare. Assuming 
that the government taxes the e-tailer g per unit of selling quantity to terminate consumer free 
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riding behavior,5 retailers can be expected to set their prices in anticipation that no consumer will 
free ride. Then the e-tailer’s objective function is 
max ( )
e
e
R e e
p
p w g q   
 
Proposition 3. The equilibrium of all firms is as follows. 
2
2 2 2
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According to this proposition, this tax has a positive impact on the return rate and e-tailer’s 
price but a negative impact on the wholesale and retailer’s price. In fact, the increase in g plays the 
same role as
rc on the recovery rate. At the same time, because this tax increases the e-tailer’s price 
and decreases the retailer’s price, it enhances the average retail price level and reduces total 
demand. Hence, under this condition, social welfare is  
                                                          
5 Although in practice, consumer free riding behavior may not be completely terminated by government tax, in the model, we 
consider the ideal optimal condition. Specifically, we set the tax exactly large enough to compress the group of free riding 
consumers until it disappears so that only two groups of consumers exist in the market: those who only purchase from the retailer 
and those who only purchase from the e-tailer.   
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,
max ( )
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Proposition 4. The optimal tax rate is * 1 2 3 4
56
rBV B f B c B cg
B
  
 where 
2 4 6 8
1 (537824 727944 333144 62154 4050 )B           
2 4 6 8
2 (268912 363972 166572 31077 2025 )B           
2 4 6
3 (358288 197652 19602 2106 )B         
2 4 6 8
4 537824 727944 333144 62154 4050B          
2 4 6 8
5 97608 110138 42555 6282 243B          
From the above equations, it is impossible to determine whether *g is positive or negative. When
* 0g  , it means the government should tax on the e-tailer. When * 0g  , it means the government 
subsidize the e-tailer. Specifically, if the government provides subsidy to the e-tailer, although the 
consumer free-riding behavior may still stop, it may not benefit but hurt the traditional retailer. 
See from proposition 3, a negative *g , which can be thought as a subsidy, will help enhance the 
status of the e-tailer’s low pricing, increase the pricing of the retailer and reduce the service lelvel 
of the retailer, which will make the retailer’s market share shrinks and the e-tailer’s market share 
increases. This governmental subsidy enlarges consumers’ utilities obtain from both sellers 
(consumers’ utilities when purchasing from the e-tailer increase and when purchasing from the 
retailer decrease), the final result may be that the e-tailer’s price is too low that consumers once 
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free ride the traditional retailer’s service will choose to directly purchasing from the e-tailer and 
some switchers once only choose to purchase from the retailer will turn to purchase from the e-
tailer.   
Corollary 4. This tax on e-tailer will reduce total carbon emissions and subsidy to e-tailer will 
increase total carbon emissions. 
Hence, according to Propositions 1a and 4, if * 0g  , the government will impose tax on the e-tailer 
and the tax will be treated as an additional cost increase to e-tailer which makes the e-tailer to 
enhance pricing level to transfer the cost to consumers. Hence the e-tailer’s market share is reduced. 
Expecting this, the manufacturer will reduce wholesale pricing level to encourage retailer and e-
tailer sales. Thus the retailer’s service level is enhanced and its pricing level is decreased and its 
market share is increased. But compared with the e-tailer, its decisions change are less sensitive to 
the tax6. That is, being imposed only on the e-tailer, this tax has more impact on the decisions of 
e-tailer than the retailer. Hence, a tax on e-tailer will reduce total market demand.  
Also if * 0g  , a subsidy means a reduction of cost to e-tailer which will make the e-tailer lower its 
product’s posted price to attract consumers. Expecting this potential trend of market expansion, 
the manufacturer will increase the wholesale price to reap profit. As the subsidy also has more 
impact on the decisions of e-tailer than the retailer, the total market demand will increase and the 
total carbon emissions also increase. It means if only from the perspective of protection to 
environment and traditional retailing, without considering social welfare, the government should 
impose tax on the e-tailer. But the role of a government is to consider the whole welfare of the 
                                                          
6 As the equations in proposition 3 show, as is not large because consumers will not fully sensitive to the retailer’s service, rp
is less sensitive to g than ep . 
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society and a government may sometimes choose to subsidize the e-tailer. The total change in 
carbon emissions can thus be expressed in the following function: 
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2( ) ( ( ) ( ))r e r e r e r eI I E q q q q e q q q q           
1: The case when free riding is present   2: The case with a tax or subsidy on the e-tailer 
As stated in corollary 1, 
1 1 1 2 2 2( ) ( )
2
r e r e
r
q q q q
k
     , that is 1 2 1 1 2 2( ) 0r e r eI I E q q q q      if 
1 1 2 2( ) ( ) 0r e r eq q q q    .  That is, the total amount of carbon emissions is positively impacted by the 
total market demand.  
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5. Numerical analysis and examples 
Because some of the algebraic expressions are too complex to intuitively analyze and compare 
firms’ decisions, profits, and the environmental impact engendered by consumer free riding, we 
assess the impact of free riding on the manufacturer using the numerical analysis adopted by most 
remanufacturing studies (e.g., Inderfurth 2005; Atasu et al. 2009; Toktay and Wei 2011; Wei and 
Zhao 2011; Xie et al. 2011; Atasu and Souza 2013; Atasu et al. 2013; Bae et al. 2010; Giovanni 
and Zaccour, 2014; Qiang 2015). We also adopt the parameters { , , }
30 25 20
V V V
f  , { , }
4 2
V V
c , 
{ , , }
20 15 10
r
c c c
c  , {0.8,0.9,1} , {0.8,0.9,1}  . At the same time, because the parameters related to 
remanufacturing have no impact on firm prices or market demand, we set the basic parameters as
0 { , , }
8 6 4
c c c
r  , { , , }
8 6 4
c c c
n  , 0.5k  . In this comparison, however, we assign no value of V ,
oe , te , E , or e  
because different products have different consumer valuations and may generate different carbon 
emissions during every stage of the life cycle.  
Remark 1. The manufacturer’s profit may be higher when free riding is present than when it is 
absent.  
See in Table 2, consumer free riding behavior will increase manufacturer’s profit. As some 
consumers always loyal to the retailer and e-tailer, the change of retailer and e-tailer’s selling 
prices caused by consumer free riding may impact the change of the quantities of loyal consumers. 
Hence, this remark means that the increase in the e-tailer’s market share induced by consumer free 
riding may exceed the decrease in the retailer’s market share. Additionally, unlike the findings of 
Xing and Liu (2012), consumer free riding behavior may increase the manufacturer’s profit. 
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Remark 2. Compared with the absence of consumer free riding, its presence may increase carbon 
emissions over the total life cycle, which may also increase when the government wants to tax on 
but actually subsidize the e-tailer.  
Seeing from table 3, consumer free riding behavior increases total carbon emissions compared 
with no free riding case and the results mean that if only for the environment, it is better for the 
government to consider no matter tax or subsidize the e-tailer to stop consumer free riding behavior. 
The result may be because the quantity of consumers located between retailer and e-tailer 
unchanged, free riding behavior increases the total market demand and hence total carbon emission 
if the sum quantity of retailer and e-tailer’s loyal consumers increases. Expecting consumers’ free 
riding behavior, the retailer will lower its service and pricing level close to that of the e-tailer to 
avoid free riding as far as possible. But to consumers, pricing has more impact on purchasing than 
service. Hence, with the presence of consumer free riding, the quantity of retailer’s loyal 
consumers increases. As the e-tailer could benefit from consumers’ free riding and knows that its 
advantage to keep consumer free riding is its low pricing, the e-tailer will lower its price to fetch 
more free riding consumers. Thus the quantity of e-tailer’s loyal consumers will also increase.   
Seeing from Table 4 and 5, although the initial intention for the government is to tax on the e-
tailer, as this policy is fair for traditional retailers and could solve the problem of tax evasion of e-
commerce, the final choice for the government is subsidize the e-tailer ( * 0g  ).  
Remark 3. If a government subsidizes the e-tailer, the result may benefit both consumer and 
social welfare. 
This benefit to both consumer and society may occur because the government tax on the e-tailer, 
although aimed at preventing consumer free riding, if it actually becomes a subsidy, may increase 
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consumers’ utilities , as given consumer valuation unchanged, the price of e-tailer is much lower. 
The profit of e-tailer will also be enhanced. In the whole society, in calculating social welfare, the 
governmental revenue (tax) or expenditure (subsidy) will not affect the total calculation. However, 
a higher demand is directly related to higher production, consumption, and recovery quantities and 
so might increase total carbon emissions.  
Hence, the above results (remarks 2 and 3) mean that a government policy can have different 
impacts on different aspects. That is, although the original intention of the governmental tax on 
the e-tailer was to lessen the negative effects of consumer free riding behavior on offline retailers, 
in consideration of social welfare maximization, a tax policy would become a subsidy policy and 
the result may improve consumer and social welfare but hurt the environment. Thus, government 
actions should reflect government purpose. If without considering aggregate social welfare, to 
protect environment and traditional retailers, the government should impose tax on the e-tailer but 
if considering consumer and social welfare, the government should provide subsidy to the e-tailer. 
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6. Conclusions 
In an effort to promote sustainable production and consumption, scholars have recently started to 
study models and designs of green or closed loop supply chains. However, the impact on carbon 
emissions of consumer free riding between traditional retailing and e-tailing channels has yet to 
be examined. To fill this research void, this study models and analyzes carbon emissions when a 
manufacturer sells through both a retailer and an e-tailer, allowing consumers to enjoy the services 
provided by the retailer but make their final purchase from the e-tailer. 
Our results indicate that consumer free riding may increase carbon emissions in a dual channel 
closed loop-supply chain even while increasing manufacturer profits. They also show that 
imposing an e-commerce tax can improve environmental performance in the supply chain as a 
whole. But the government may choose to subsidize on e-commerce instead of tax. The practical 
implications of the study are thus twofold: first, manufacturers should be cautious about 
developing a dual channel distribution because of consumer free riding’s negative impact on the 
environment; and second, governmental taxes on e-tailing transactions have the potential to 
improve sustainability in dual channel closed loop supply chains.   
Admittedly, the study is subject to certain limitations, so the results should be interpreted 
cautiously. Nevertheless, the findings raise several interesting directions for further study. For 
example, future research might consider a scenario in which the retailer, e-tailer, or a third-party 
collects used products. It might also drop our assumption that all players make decisions under a 
condition of complete information to reflect the reality that in practice, information can be 
incomplete. Hence, no matter its shortcomings, the model developed here provides a useful starting 
point for additional investigation and validation. 
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Appendix A. 
Proof of proposition 1.  
In the second decision stage, the sellers find their optimal prices and service level given a previous 
first stage choice of return rate  and wholesale price w . The first-order conditions of sellers when 
free riding is absent are given by 
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By substituting the sellers’ optimal reactions into the manufacturer’s objective function, the first-
order condition of w yields 
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By substituting the wholesale price into the manufacturer’s function, the first-order condition of 
yields 
, where 
 
 
Solving yields ,  
Here, only is a feasible solution, whose substitution into the second-order expression yields
. Thus, is the unique equilibrium solution to the game. Even if the first-order conditions 
of and are solved and the Hessian Matrix derived simultaneously, the equilibrium solutions do 
not change. 
The solutions when free riding is present are similarly derived. 
 
Proof of proposition 2.  
Given the manufacturer’s profit function, similarly solving the first- and second-order conditions 
yields the following manufacturer decisions:  
When free riding is absent, the return rate and wholesale price are 

2
1 2 32 2 2 2
3
( )
(140 51 (168 36 ))
M l t l t l
k

   

   
   
2 2 2 4 2 4 4
1 2016 504 -1008 108 2016 216 216 4704 2352 4704 2352r rl rc k k c r k fr k fr kV r rc k kV r rck rkc kVr kfr               
4 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 4
2
4 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2
432 2016 4032 1008 216 2016 216 4704 2352 4704
54 504 3920 4704 216 2016 504 1008 4704 9408 4704
216
r r
r r r
l kV c kV f kV c kV cr kV f kc kc kfc kfc kc c
k f k f r kV k fc k fc k fc k c c kVc kVc kVf
kV
      
     
           
          
2 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 22016 4704 1176 306 1176 2268rkV kc kc r kf r        
2 2 4 2 4 4 2
3 1134 2268 306 2268 1960 1960 3920 3920 306 153 714r rl r f rV rV rc rc rf rc rV rc r f r c                
0M





1
2( )
0
V c f
r

 
  
2
2 2 2
(140 51 )
6 ((28 6 )( ) (14 3 ) 14 )r
r
k V c f c


 


    
2
2
2
0M





2
w 
 42 
 
,  
When free riding is present, the return rate and wholesale price are 
 
 
Equilibrium can then be derived by substituting all the reactions into the government’s social 
welfare function and solving the first- and second-order conditions of .  
Appendix B. 
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20
c
     
6
c
      20.0057V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.0057V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.0056V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.0056V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.0056V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.0056V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.0056V  
20
V
    
2
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.0056V  
M  M (the government taxes the e-tailer to stop consumer free riding) - M (consumer free 
riding behavior is present) 
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Table 3.  Total life cycle carbon emissions difference between situations when consumer free 
riding is present and absent 
0.8  , 0.8  , 0.5k   
f       c       rc      r        I  
30
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.0310V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      20.0310V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.0310V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.0309V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.0309V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.0309V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.0308V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.0308V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.0308V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.0209V  
 48 
 
30
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      20.0209V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.0209V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.0208V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.0208V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.0208V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.0206V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.0206V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.0206V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.0312V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      20.0312V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.0312V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.0312V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.0312V  
 49 
 
25
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.0312V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.0311V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.0311V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.0311V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.0211V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      20.0211V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.0211V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.0210V  
25
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.0210V  
25
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.0210V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.0208V  
25
V
     
2
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.0208V  
25
V
     
2
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.0208V  
 50 
 
20
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.0315V  
20
V
     
4
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
       20.0315V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.0315V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.0315V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.0315V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.0315V  
20
V
     
4
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.0314V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.0314V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.0314V  
20
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.0214V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      20.0214V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.0214V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.0214V  
 51 
 
20
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.0214V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.0214V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.0212V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.0212V  
20
V
    
2
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.0212V  
I  I (consumer free riding is present)- I (consumer free riding is absent) 
Table 4.   Optimal governmental tax on e-tailer 
0.8  , 0.8  , 0.5k   
f       c       rc      r        
*g  
30
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      0.5853V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      0.5853V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      0.5853V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      0.5892V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      0.5892V  
 52 
 
30
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      0.5892V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      0.5969V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      0.5969V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      0.5969V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      0.4099V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      0.4099V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      0.4099V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      0.4177V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      0.4177V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      0.4177V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      0.4332V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      0.4332V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      0.4332V  
 53 
 
25
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      0.5878V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      0.5878V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      0.5878V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      0.5917V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      0.5917V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      0.5917V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      0.5994V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      0.5994V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      0.5994V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      0.4124V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      0.4124V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      0.4124V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      0.4202V  
 54 
 
25
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      0.4202V  
25
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      0.4202V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      0.4357V  
25
V
     
2
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      0.4357V  
25
V
     
2
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      0.4357V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      0.5915V  
20
V
     
4
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
       0.5915V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      0.5915V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      0.5954V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      0.5954V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      0.5954V  
20
V
     
4
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      0.6032V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      0.6032V  
 55 
 
20
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      0.6032V  
20
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      0.4161V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      0.4161V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      0.4161V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      0.4239V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      0.4239V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      0.4239V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      0.4394V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      0.4394V  
20
V
    
2
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      0.4394V  
 56 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Total life cycle carbon emissions change when the government wants to impose tax on 
the e-tailer 
0.8  , 0.8  , 0.5k   
f       c       rc      r        I  
30
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.1352V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      20.1352V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.1352V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.1363V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.1363V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.1363V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.1386V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.1386V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.1386V  
 57 
 
30
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.0955V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      20.0955V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.0955V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.0978V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.0978V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.0978V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.1024V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.1024V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.1024V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.1357V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      20.1357V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.1357V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.1368V  
 58 
 
25
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.1368V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.1368V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.1391V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.1391V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.1391V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.0960V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      20.0960V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.0960V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.0983V  
25
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.0983V  
25
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.0983V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.1029V  
25
V
     
2
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.1029V  
 59 
 
25
V
     
2
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.1029V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.1364V  
20
V
     
4
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
       20.1364V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.1364V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.1375V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.1375V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.1375V  
20
V
     
4
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.1398V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.1398V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.1398V  
20
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.0967V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      20.0967V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.0967V  
 60 
 
20
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.0990V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.0990V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.0990V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.1036V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.1036V  
20
V
    
2
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.1036V  
I  I (the government taxes the e-tailer to stop consumer free riding)  I (consumer free riding is 
present) 
 
 
Table 6.  Consumer welfare difference 
0.8  , 0.8  , 0.5k   
f       c       rc      r        CW  
30
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.0703V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      20.0703V  
 61 
 
30
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.0703V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.0716V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.0716V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.0716V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.0742V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.0742V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.0742V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.0355V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      20.0355V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.0355V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.0374V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.0374V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.0374V  
 62 
 
30
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.0412V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.0412V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.0412V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.0709V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      20.0709V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.0709V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.0722V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.0722V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.0722V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.0749V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.0749V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.0749V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.0360V  
 63 
 
25
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      20.0360V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.0360V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.0379V  
25
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.0379V  
25
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.0379V  
25
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.0417V  
25
V
     
2
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.0417V  
25
V
     
2
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.0417V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.0719V  
20
V
     
4
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
       20.0719V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.0719V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.0732V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.0732V  
 64 
 
20
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.0732V  
20
V
     
4
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.0759V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.0759V  
20
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.0759V  
20
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.0366V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      20.0366V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.0366V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.0385V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.0385V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.0385V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.0424V  
20
V
     
2
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.0424V  
20
V
    
2
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.0424V  
 65 
 
CW  CW (the government taxes the e-tailer to stop consumer free riding)  CW (consumer free 
riding is present) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.  Social welfare difference 
0.8  , 0.8  , 0.5k   
f       c       rc      r        SW  
30
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.0255V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      20.0255V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.0255V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.0260V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.0260V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.0260V  
 66 
 
30
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.0270V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.0270V  
30
V
      
4
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.0270V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
8
c
      20.0129V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
6
c
      20.0129V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
20
c
     
4
c
      20.0129V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
8
c
      20.0136V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
6
c
      20.0136V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
15
c
     
4
c
      20.0136V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
8
c
      20.0150V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
6
c
      20.0150V  
30
V
      
2
V
     
10
c
     
4
c
      20.0150V  
25
V
      
4
V
     
20
c
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SW  SW (the government taxes the e-tailer to stop consumer free riding)  SW (consumer free 
riding is present) 
 
 
 
 
